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CIVICS 2000: PROCESS 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AT YALE 
Daniel J. Hulsebosch* 
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS. By Bruce Ackerman. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 515. $29.95. 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION. By 
Akhil Reed Amar. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. 
xv, 441. $30. 
One or another form of historical fidelity has long been in the 
repertoire of constitutional interpretation, and during the last two 
decades conservative jurists have searched for the "original intent" 
of various clauses. Increasingly, however, it is liberal law professors 
who are turning to history to make sense of American constitution­
alism. What they find there is not a document listing eternal rights 
or duties but rather a multidimensional structure of government, 
captured as much in practice as on paper, that has metamorphosed 
over time. It seems we have, in that familiar phrase, a living Consti­
tution. But interest is shifting from noun to adjective: how, and 
why, has the Constitution changed? 
Two recent explorations are Bruce Ackerman's We the People: 
Transformations, 1 the second volume of his epic trilogy of Ameri­
can constitutional history,2 and Akhil Reed Amar's The Bill of 
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction,3 also part of a larger project.4 
Each of these well-written books is a rich contribution to the histor­
ical and theoretical literature of the Constitution and deserves a 
large readership. Although they differ in style and substance, both 
convey the same main point: the federal Constitution is premised 
on popular sovereignty, made by the People and for the People. 
* Samuel I. Golieb Fellow in Legal History, 1998-99, New York University School of 
Law; Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. A.B. 1987, Colgate; J.D. 
1991, Columbia; A.M. 1993, Ph.D. 1999 {forthcoming), Harvard. - Ed. The author thanks 
the members of the Legal History Colloquium at New York University School of Law, as 
well as Alfred Brophy, for helpful co=ents. 
1. Bruce Ackerman is Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. 
2. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (Volume 1 of the tril­
ogy) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]. Volume 3, We the People: Interpretations, is still to come. 
3. Akhil Amar is Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University. 
4. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES (1997); AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FoR TIIE PEOPLE: WHAT TIIE 
CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABoUT YouR RIGHTS (1998). 
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The People have legitimately altered the document over the past 
two centuries, through the Article V5 amendment process and 
otherwise; it has also been interpreted, rightly and wrongly, along 
the way. In short, there has been and will continue to be good and 
bad constitutional change. Professors Ackerman and Amar try to 
distinguish one from the other and offer guidance on how to make 
better choices in the future. Though they occasionally criticize par­
ticular alterations and doctrines on their merits,6 the focus is on 
how such changes are made. They are more concerned with the 
procedures of constitutional changes than their consequences -
though they imply, as Ackerman has written before, that "form [i]s 
substance."7 Together, their books signal the rise of a new strand of 
constitutional studies, what might be called constitutional process. 
Ackerman and Amar are at the center of this movement but are not 
alone.8 It is a third-generation descendant of the legal process 
school, which Amar has elsewhere described in this "rough-and­
ready" way: 
The legal process school focuses primary attention on who is, or 
ought, to make a given legal decision, and how that decision is, or 
ought, to be made. Is, or ought, a particular legal question to be re­
solved by the federal or state government? By courts, legislatures, or 
executive agencies? If by courts, at the trial level or by appellate 
tribunals? If at trial, by judges or juries? Subject to what standard of 
appellate review? And so on. The question what is or ought to be the 
substantive law governing citizen behavior in a given area is no longer 
the sole, or even the dominant, object of legal analysis. Rather, legal 
process analysis illuminates how substantive norms governing primary 
conduct shape, and are in tum shaped by, organizational structure 
and procedural rules.9 
5. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of 
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, 
which in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitu­
tion, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Con­
ventions in three fourths thereof . . . •  
U.S. CONST. art. V. 
6. More so Amar than Ackerman. 
7. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING .AMERICAN LAW, v (1984) [hereinafter 
RECONSTRUCTING). 
8. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ. 1119 
(1995); cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221, 1246 (1995) (referring to 
recent work of Ackerman and Amar and stating that "I am tempted to note the emergence 
of a distinctive new 'Yale school' of constitutional interpretation"). 
9. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARv. L. REv. 688, 691 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M. 
BATOR ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
(3d ed, 1988)); see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-99 
(1995); William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to 
The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART JR. & Al.BERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW li-cxxxvi (1994); G. Edward 
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Ackerman and Amar have inherited the earlier school's keen 
sense of institutional competence. They are, however, more openly 
normative than the mid-century legal process adherents.10 Their ef­
forts - in truth, too inchoate to label a school - are similarly dis­
tinguishable from second-generation democratic process theory 
(best represented in the work of John Hart Ely11) because they hold 
that some substantive values are immune from ordinary democratic 
process and can only be changed by a complex constitutional pro­
cess. Nonetheless, they concentrate on the means of change rather 
than the political values that actually change. The examples they 
give of the latter they find coherent and unproblematic: the 
Founding institutionalized popular sovereignty, the notion that the 
people could govern themselves; Reconstruction enshrined racial 
equality; and (for Ackerman) the New Deal legitimated the welfare 
state. 
Ackerman and Amar have written large, dense books. No re­
view can do justice to the intricate arguments of either, let alone 
both. This review aims only to sketch the historical accounts in 
each book, explore the premise of popular sovereignty in both, and 
suggest what this tum to history indicates about American 
constitutionalism. 
I. MAPPING CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
Ackerman and Amar know the historiography of the federal 
Constitution well. They delve into the primary sources of certain 
transformative periods and offer many fresh insights about Ameri­
can law and history. Their research substantially overlaps. Both 
discuss the Founding of the Constitution in the 1780s (Ackerman 
pp. 32-9 5; Amar pp. 3- 133) and Reconstruction following the Civil 
War (Ackerman pp. 99-2 52; Amar pp. 166-294). To these, 
Ackerman adds a third transformation: the New Deal (pp. 255-
3 82). This is not the only difference between them. Ackerman's 
perspective is broader, encompassing the whole expanse of United 
States constitutional development. In contrast, Amar confines him­
self to the (still capacious) story of the Bill of Rights, its origins and 
revision in the 1860s. Moreover, Amar is more of a textualist, dog­
gedly pointing out the repetition of key words, here in the main 
body of the Constitution, there in the amendments, once again in 
White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 
59 VA. L. REv. 279 {1973). 
10. For Ackerman's critique of the legal process school, see RECONSTRUCTING, supra 
note 7, at 38-42. 
11. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
{1980). 
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The Federalist Papers, and so on.12 As historians, both are more 
hedgehog than fox;13 the big truth they know is popular sover­
eignty.14 But Amar is more impressive when playing the fox. Tight 
and full of close readings, his book might affect constitutional law 
on the ground, perhaps footnoted beneath knotty analyses in the 
United States Reports. Ackerman is after bigger game: the consti­
tutional consciousness of the legal community. 
A. Ackerman's High Road to Constitutional History 
"Th[e] focus upon successful moments of mobilized popular re­
newal," writes Ackerman early in Transformations, "distinguishes 
the American Constitution from most others in the modern world" 
(p. 5). His fundamental claim, argued now for fifteen years,15 is 
that the United States is a "dualistic democracy," meaning that its 
constitutional history follows two tracks: "normal politics" and 
"constitutional politics." On the first track runs most of American 
political history. Ordinarily, government is administered by the 
People's representatives, voted in and tossed out of office by a 
skeptical public, who devote more time to private than public con­
cerns. This is as it should be, thinks Ackerman, for there is more to 
life than government. But then there are extraordinary moments 
when the People think seriously about their Constitution. At these 
times of constitutional politics, they may set aside the textual for- . 
malities of amendment and redefine the parameters of normal poli­
tics or "normal lawmaking."16 
In his trilogy, Ackerman approaches the three moments -
Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal- from three angles. In 
the first volume, Foundations, Ackerman established his dualist 
framework, sketched his three-moment scheme of constitutional 
history, and declared his desire to reconstruct for "the caste of 
American lawyers and judges . . . something I will call a profes­
sional narrative, a story describing how the American people got 
from the Founding in 1 787 to the Bicentennial of yesterday."17 In 
Transformations, he fleshes out the historical moments and traces 
12. See, e.g., Amar at 27 (connecting use of "the People" in the Constitution, First 
Amendment, and in the ratification debates). Amar labels as "intratextuality" such "textual 
cross-references to the original Constitution and Bill" and relationships between the Bill and 
other key English and American documents. P. 296. 
13. For this distinction, see lsAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox: AN EssAY 
ON TOLSTOY'S VIEW OF HISTORY (1953). 
14. See, e.g., Ackerman at 5, 13-14, 88, 92; Amar at xiii (arguing that "[t]he essence of the 
Bill of Rights was more structural than not, more majoritarian than counter"). 
15. He outlined the project in Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the 
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). 
16. Ackerman su=arizes his "dualist" theory in TRANSFORMATIONS, pp. 5-6, but for a 
fuller treatment, see generally FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2. 
17. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4. 
1524 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1520 
the different procedures used during each one to effect constitu­
tional change. In the forthcoming third, Interpretations, he 
promises to examine how the Supreme Court has made sense of, or 
"synthesized," the People's serial transformations. 
As has been pointed out,18 Ackerman's division of constitu­
tional history into static periods punctuated by discontinuous 
change reflects the influence of paradigm theory.19 The dualism of 
normal and constitutional politics also artfully synthesizes the lib­
eral and republican interpretations of American history, drawing on 
both while avoiding the sterile debate of when (or if) republicanism 
gave way to liberalism.20 Ackerman's "liberal republicanism"21 has 
it both ways. The default mode of American constitutionalism is 
liberal, meaning that individuals are usually content to leave gov­
ernment to the governors and tend to their private interests. At 
crisis moments, however, visionary leaders initiate a dialogue about 
constitutional change and the People become republican citizens. 
As has also been pointed out,22 Ackerman's logic suggests 
Hegel's. His People move through thesis and antithesis toward a 
new synthesis of freedom, then the process begins anew. The dia­
lectic is everywhere in Ackerman's books, and the personification 
of political phenomena comes to him reflexively. There are 
"Madison & Co." (the Founding) (p. 33), "Bingham & Co." 
(Reconstruction), and "Roosevelt & Co." (the New Deal) (p. 260), 
in addition to "the People. "23 There is also an undercurrent of fa­
talism in this otherwise exuberant tale: time and again whatever 
happened is seen to have happened necessarily. But these are loose 
methodological connections, for Ackerman avoids reliance on any 
18. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1522-23 (1988). 
19. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvoLunONS {2d ed. 1970). 
In an earlier book, Ackerman acknowledged the influence of Kuhn on his own structure of 
thought. See RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 60 n.16. 
20. See Daniel T. Rogers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11 
(1992). 
21. The term is used in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 29. See also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Beyond the Republican Revival, 91 YALE LJ. 1539, 1541 (1988). Similarly, though at a higher 
level of historical generality, Ackerman claimed in his first volume that the Constitution was 
a "creative synthesis " of the Greek tradition of "political involvement " and the "Christian 
suspicion of claims of secular community . . .  and (belief] that the secular state's coercive 
authority represents the supreme threat to the highest human values. " FOUNDATIONS, supra 
note 2, at 321-22. 
22. See Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and 
the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1135, 1217 (1988). 
23. In Transformations, Ackerman answers earlier charges of anthropomorphism by stat­
ing that "'the People' is not the name of a superhuman being, but the name of an extended 
process of interaction between political elites and ordinary citizens. " P. 187. Cf. p. 162 ("I 
will argue that it was the People themselves who took this decision away from competing 
political elites in Washington and decided it on their own responsibility. It is this decision of 
a mobilized People, and not any textual formalism, that lies at the foundation of the Four­
teenth Amendment. "). 
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substantive body of political philosophy. So Hegel goes unnamed 
in these books, as does, save one negative reference, Rousseau.24 A 
more doctrinaire exponent of the People's political will might have 
given them prominent roles (whether protagonists or antagonists). 
Instead, even the supporting European cast of Edmund Burke and 
Hannah Arendt in Foundations25 has moved offstage. The spotlight 
in Transformations is trained on American political leaders, who 
initiate change, and the People, who respond. 
Along with the distinction between normal and constitutional 
politics goes another: that between government and the People.26 
This is a variation on the dichotomy, much older than paradigm 
theory, the republican revival, and Hegelian logic, between a spe­
cific governing administration and a constitution. Historically, it 
was not always accepted; indeed, in the early modem English world 
it had an oppositional quality about it. In the seventeenth century, 
Edward Coke, John Davies, Matthew Hale, and other common law 
jurists invoked an "ancient constitution" to challenge royal power.27 
Similar was the contrast between a government of laws and one of 
men, articulated pithily during the Interregnum by English coni­
monwealthman James Harrington28 and circulated throughout the 
Atlantic world by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century, becoming 
commonplace in America.29 But perhaps the clearest distinction 
between "the constitution" and "government" came in the early 
eighteenth century from a former Jacobite and disgruntled Tory, 
Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke.30 In his view, governments 
24. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5. As for Hegel, Ackerman laments the turn 
among early twentieth-century historians to Marx and social explanations of American his­
tory, then celebrates the reclamation of the political by Hannah Arendt and the republican 
school of historians, see id. at 200-209 (Chapter Eight, "The Lost Revolution"), which might 
be interpreted allegorically as a recovery of the idealist thrust (though hardly the specific 
political program) of Hegel's philosophy. See G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
(James Sibree trans., Dover Publications 1956) (1837). 
25. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 17-24, 204-12. 
26. See also id. at 6-7 (arguing that a "dualist Constitution" distinguishes between deci­
sions made by the American people and decisions made by their government). 
27. See J.G.A. PocoCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAw: A STUDY 
OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 30-69 (rev. ed. 1987). 
28. See James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE OCEANA AND OTHER 
WoRKS OF JAMES HAruuNGTON, EsQ. 33 (1737) (1652). On the commonwealthmen, see 
CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CoMMON WEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE 
TRANSMISSION, DEVELOPMENT AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM 
THE RESTORATION OF CHARLEs II UNTIL THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN CoLONIES (1959). 
29. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Anne M. Cobler et al. trans., Cambridge 
University Press 1989) (1748); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961). 
30. On Bolingbroke, compare lsAAc KRAMN!cK, BoLINGBROKE AND His CmcLE: THE 
PoLmcs OF NOSTALGIA IN THE AGE OF w ALPOLE 4 (1968) (arguing that Bolingbroke and 
other Augustan thinkers "saw an aristocratic social and political order being undermined by 
money and new financial institutions and they didn't like it"), with Quentin Skinner, The 
Principle and Practice of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke Versus Walpole, in H!STORI-
1526 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1520 
came and went, some good and some bad, depending on whether 
their ministers adhered to the transcendent English constitution. 
This Bolingbroke defined as 
that assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, derived from cer­
tain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain fixed objects of pub­
lic good, that compose the general system, according to which the 
community hath agreed to be governed ... .  In a word .. . constitution 
is the rule by which our princes ought to govern at all times; govern­
ment is that by which they actually do govern at any particular time.31 
The distinction provided leverage to criticize the Whig administra­
tion of Robert Walpole while maintaining a posture of political loy­
alty. Ackerman's point is that the two are not exclusive. His 
"higher lawmaking" (p. 6) comes not from the fixed principles of 
reason or other fundamental law tradition; nor is it ancient law. 
Grounded on custom and consent, it is majoritarian, but of a spe­
cial, dualist kind.32 That is, the Constitution is not merely the ag­
gregate preferences of "the winners of the last general election," 
what Ackerman in Foundations calls "monist democracy. "33 In­
stead, it is based on a procedurally complex and restrained majori­
tarianism - process constitutionalism. 
Ackerman's new book is long ( 420 pages, plus almost a thou­
sand endnotes) and took many years to write. He remarks with 
disarming candor in his preface that 
Foundations made many controversial historical claims, and I was 
obliged to substantiate them if I hoped to be taken seriously. I re­
turned to my historical manuscripts with trepidation. Rereading 
them, I was impressed with the m1mber of relevant investigations that 
I had not even attempted. Was I cut out for this job? [p. ix] 
Once he leaves the roman numbered pages and enters the arabic, 
Ackerman regains confidence, as he should, for Transformations 
goes far toward making good on his earlier promises. He is an ef­
fective writer, though (deliberately, it seems) not an elegant one. 
The reader must work through five-part moments, incessant italics, 
and weighty capitalized nouns. Then come arrow diagrams, cross­
self-references, and exhortations to go "deeper." Finally, however, 
it all begins to flow and it matters not where you dive in, for the 
whole thing circles around, making the same points at new levels of 
generality. One volume blends into the other, themes of even ear-
CAL PERSPECTIVES: STUDIES IN ENGLISH THOUGHT AND SOCIETY 93, 126 {Neil McKendrick 
ed., 1974) ("Bolingbroke simply wanted to remind his Whig enemies • . .  of the views held by 
the accredited theorists of their own party about the concept of political liberty, in order to 
be able to make use of the immensely strong resonances of this tradition of thought to fur­
ther his own wholly cynical and self-interested political ends."). 
31. 2 BoLINGBROKE, A Dissertation on Parties, in THE Worucs OF LoRD BOLINGBROKE 
88-89 (1841). 
32. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 3-33. 
33. Id. at 7-10. 
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lier works resurface, and chits are signed for Volume 3. His goal is 
to demonstrate that the American People, when amending the Con­
stitution, have not always followed the "hypertextualist"34 require­
ments of Article V; yet they have followed a formula that is similar, 
and paradoxically more demanding, than Article V .  "For 
Americans, law-breaking does not necessarily imply lawlessness. It 
is sometimes seen as a civic gesture indicating high seriousness."35 
Their change has been "unconventional" (p. 82) but procedurally 
regular. They may transform political aspiration into higher law by 
a variety of institutional means� so long as they engage in a constitu­
tional dialogue. Vocabulary and accent change; the dialogic gram­
mar does not. 
This structuralist formula for constitutional change has five 
stages: signal, proposal, trigger, ratification, and consolidation (pp. 
39-40). Because this formula was fundamental to the Founding of 
the Constitution, it is intrinsic to it, not an interpretive outgrowth.36 
The process has recurred successfully twice, during Reconstruction 
and the New Deal. Ackerman tries to defuse the criticism that the 
claim of recurrence is "a tell-tale sign of a grim determination to 
impose my fivefold schema on constitutional history without serious 
attention to the particularities of particular cases" by asserting that 
"[t]he five-phase pattern recurs because the problems recur" (p. 
67). Rather than a single instance, a moment is a contractual pro­
cess, a series of repeated offers and acceptances between political 
elites and the People. By articulating the proposed change to the 
People, involving several governmental institutions, and heeding 
the returns of transformative elections, the Framers of the three 
constitutional transformations exercised statesmanlike vision and 
prudence. And each time the People tendered well-considered 
acceptances. 
Rather than supposing that the People speak directly at the ballot 
box, the Federalist precedent promises legitimation through a deepen-
34. Ackerman labels "hypertextualist" those who treat Article V as the exclusive means 
of amendment. He does not call this position merely "textualist" because he argues that the 
Founders meant to allow other modes of change too; they believed, as an originalist matter, 
in "pluralist" methods of amendment. Thus his theory of unconventional change is middle­
road textualism, neither hypertextualist nor extratextualist. See pp. 72-81. 
35. P. 14. Ackerman could have cited historical works that examine the relationship be­
tween constitutionality and legality or (a related theme) resistance theory. See, e.g., PAULINE 
MAIER, FROM REsISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF AMERICAN QpposmoN TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776 (1972); JoHN P. REID, IN A REBELLIOUS 
SPIRIT: THE ARGUMENTS OF FAcrs, THE LIBERTY RroT, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERI­
CAN REVOLUTION (1979). 
36. Ackerman refers approvingly to those who have rediscovered the "unwritten consti­
tution" of the Founders but tries to avoid the textual-nontextual dichotomy. See, e.g., 
Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Rev­
olutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten 
Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1127 (1987). 
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ing institutional dialogue between political elites and ordinary citizens. 
The idea is that a form of complex, and temporally extended, institu­
tional practice will ultimately permit a group of revolutionary reform­
ers a kind of popular authority that is qualitatively different from 
normal electoral victories. [pp. 84-85] 
In this qualified sense, Ackerman makes an originalist argu­
ment:37 the writ of constitutional ejectment is not his; it is the 
Founders'. To document his case, Ackerman begins not quite at the 
beginning but rather the conventional beginning: the writing of the 
federal Constitution.38 He argues that the Philadelphia Convention 
engaged in illegal constitution-making. Article 13 of the Articles of 
Confederation required unanimous approval by the state legisla­
tures for any amendment. But the Convention took "the law into 
its own hands" and became "a secessionist body" (p. 3 5), creating 
the troublesome irony that the world's most famous constitution 
rests on a coup d'etat. Well, Ackerman argues, not quite. The 
Federalists put aside Article 13, but not constitutional process. At 
each step toward organizing the new Constitution they won "offi­
cial confirmations" for facially "illegal initiative[s]," thereby repeat­
edly gaining "enough acceptance by enough standing institutions to 
sustain their momentum" (p. 39). 
Here follows an ingenious mapping of the "fivefold schema" 
onto the writing and ratification of the Constitution. Instead of 
"aiming for a single grand victory," "Madison & Co." followed "a 
stepwise process - in which one partial initiative built on the next 
in a series of sequential ratifications" (p. 42). They moved from 
small conferences with limited agendas (Mount Vernon, Annapolis) 
to larger ones, exceeding their mandate at each one, yet confirmed 
along the way by some of the states or the Continental Congress. 
Thus they signaled a desire to engage in higher track constitutional 
creation and established a precedent for the illegality of the 
Philadelphia Convention. There, Federalists proposed a new re­
gime, and triggered "an entirely new procedure for ratification": 
ratification by state conventions rather than state legislatures. Fi­
nally, the Federalists consolidated their victory by obtaining legiti­
mate support in the states slow to ratify: eventually, even North 
Carolina and Rhode Island joined the "institutional bandwagon" 
(pp. 41-65). All this is not to prove Ackerman can draw an impres­
sive historical map. Rather, his ulterior motive is to demonstrate 
that the Federalists earned "a deep sense of constitutional authority 
even though they had not played by the rules" (pp. 39). They be-
37. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REv. 918, 933 (1992) 
(reviewing FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2) (accusing Ackerman of proposing a "liberal 
originalism"). 
38. There are a few perfunctory references to the English Convention of 1688 as a loose 
precedent for 1787. Pp. 33, 81-82, 162, 169. 
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haved illegally but legitimately, adhering to a constitutional order if 
not textual law.39 
It is an impressive performance. There is something persuasive 
and hopeful about dualism.40 It is wrong to consider the Founding 
a conspiracy and morally attractive to emphasize the participatory 
elements of American constitutional history. More were involved 
than Federalists, government bondholders, or other elite groups. 
And Ackerman correctly points out that the Constitution quickly 
attained legitimacy. True, he leaves out the important role the Bill 
of Rights played in this story, but Ackerman's scheme is flexible 
enough to incorporate this fact (it might fit nicely beneath consoli­
dation) and others necessarily omitted in a sixty-page rendition of 
the Founding. 
The flexibility of Ackerman's scheme resides in its abstraction. 
This is not an unqualified good. The Annapolis Conference was a 
"signal" for constitutional revision? For purposes of an historical 
survey, it may be useful to see it as such, now. But does it rob the 
actual moment, then, of its uncertainty? While Ackerman wants to 
restore the agency of the People, he glosses over the concrete 
choices made by key figures in the late 1780s, a variegated group 
not well captured by "Madison & Co." Figuring who wanted what, 
and realizing that not all the Founders (or the voting public, let 
alone the larger majority of the People without the vote )41 wanted 
the same thing, is not to backslide into Beardianism.42 In retro­
spect, historical development often looks linear, graduated, and ra­
tional. Depending on the facts marshalled, and how they are 
arranged, almost any transition might be anatomized in terms of 
signal, proposal, trigger, ratification, and consolidation. Like many 
models, it is difficult to disprove because it is (abstractly) descrip­
tive and (politically) prescriptive, but not explanatory. Historians 
will criticize the theory and its proof not for being wrong but rather 
for not engaging several interesting levels of analysis. 
39. In Foundations, Ackerman stressed that he found the Federalists' constitutional 
means, not their specific ends, attractive, and distinguished between "the revolutionary pro­
cess through which the Federalists mobilized popular support for their constitutional reforms, 
and the property-oriented substance of their particular social vision." FOUNDATIONS, supra 
note 2, at 228. 
40. See also Edmund S. Morgan, The Fiction of 'The People,' N.Y. REv. BooKS 46 (Apr. 
23, 1992); Jack N. Rakove, Book Review, 79 J. AM. HIST. 226, 227 (reviewing FOUNDATIONS, 
supra note 2) (1992). 
41. See, e.g., "We, Some of the People": Apportionment in the Thirteen State Conventions 
Ratifying the Constitution, 56 J. AM. HIST. 21 (1969). Ackerman touches all too briefly on 
this problem of the extent of suffrage, which is surprising because his model of popular ac­
ceptance hinges on electoral participation. 
42. Ackerman flogged this much-too-dead horse in FoUNDATIONs, supra note 2, at 201-
03, 219-21. For similar reservations, see Morgan, supra note 40; Eben Moglen, The Incom­
pleat Burkean: Broce Ackerman's Foundation for Constitutional History, 5 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 531, 543 (1993). 
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Most of these would involve greater specificity and Ackerman 
might dismiss problematic facts as irrelevant where not assimilable, 
so many trees and no forest. Others involve a higher level of con­
ceptualization and a broader temporal frame.43 Take empire. The 
history of the British Empire in America is off Ackerman's concep­
tual radar. But the Empire comprised an important network of in­
stitutions, constitutional languages, and practices - exactly the 
sorts of things that interest him. And it mattered. It is not possible 
to understand constitutional reform in 1787 without having some 
grasp on how Britons in America had layered their institutions and 
the ways they tried to reform the Empire not once but several times 
in the century before the American Revolution, itself a rebellion 
against imperial reconstruction.44 After the Revolution, political 
debate continued in the key of empire: Should the Union45 become 
a continental empire? A transatlantic commercial empire? An 
"[e]mpire of liberty"?46 Some combination? Alexander Hamilton 
referred to such questions in Federalist 1 when he exclaimed that 
the debate over the Constitution "speaks its own importance; com­
prehending in its consequences, nothing less than the existence of 
the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is com­
posed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting 
in the world."47 In short, making 1787 a discontinuous moment -
no past, all future - obscures the Founders' conceptual architec­
ture. Little wonder the People, liberal republicanism, Arendt, and 
Burke flood into the vacuum. 
Many concede that the 1787 Constitution was born in some sort 
of illegality.48 But Ackerman argues that the Federalist act of crea­
tion was no one-off. Like the common lawyers they for the most 
part were, the Framers of the 1860s and 1930s followed the Federal­
ist precedent closely. Modes of change changed; the Federalist five­
part formula endured - despite Article V.49 
43. On temporal frames in argumentation, see REcoNSTRUCDNG, supra note 7, at 53-55. 
44. Suggestive essays include Jack P. Greene, The Colonial Origins of American Constitu­
tionalism, in NEGOTIATED Au:rHORITIES! EssAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL AND CONSTITU­
TIONAL HISTORY 25 (1994); John M. Murrin, The British and Colonial Background of 
American Constitutionalism, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 19 
(Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987). 
45. An imperially resonant term. See A UNION FOR EMPIRE: PoLmCAL THOUGHT AND 
THE BRmsH UNION OF 1707 (John Robertson ed., 1995). 
46. Thomas Jefferson to George Rogers Clark, December 25, 1780, 4 THE PAPERS oF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 237. 
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
48. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457, 465 (1994) (arguing that the actions of the 
Philadelphia Convention were legal under the law of treaties). 
49. Ackerman's argument that the 1787 Framers did not intend Article V to be exclusive 
(pp. 71-81) is less compelling than his argument that, in fact, some future amendments did 
not adhere to Article V 's rigid procedures. He follows the historical argument with a moral 
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But were not the Reconstruction amendments (numbers 13, 14, 
and 15) passed pursuant to Article V? Not exactly. Ackerman re­
lates how these amendments were, more or less, forced upon the 
South. The Congress that passed the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments was "a Republican Rump" (p. 106) and would not 
have mustered the two-thirds majorities necessary if the former 
Confederate states had been part of it. Paradoxically, the southern 
states that ratified the Thirteenth Amendment were considered 
legal for purposes of ratification but not for Congressional repre­
sentation. Most of the Confederate states first rejected the Four­
teenth Amendment, ratifying it only after a Radical Congress 
granted freedmen the vote while denying it to many Confederate 
veterans, and after Congress stipulated ratification as a condition 
for its reception of southern representatives. "It follows that the 
process by which Congress procured ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment simply cannot be squared with the text" (p. 111). 
Q.E.D.: The Reconstruction amendments are actually 
"amendment-simulacra" (p. 270). They might be justified as war 
measures, but this strikes Ackerman as constitutionally unattractive 
and historically inaccurate. 
Rejecting the "dichotomy between legalistic perfection and law­
less force" (p. 116), he finds instead the fivefold formula. But the 
formula did not operate in exactly the same way as it had at the 
Founding or for each Amendment. Here follows a gripping narra­
tive of Reconstruction constitutional politics, the strongest part of 
Ackerman's book. The People approved the T hirteenth 
Amendment under Presidential leadership, while a convention-like 
Republican Congress organized acceptance of the Fourteenth. 
First, Thirteen. Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 signaled 
that a "new movement had gained sufficient political authority to 
demand that others take its constitutional intentions seriously" (p. 
127). The Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 initiated the propo­
sal for constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.50 The presi­
dential creation of interim southern governments served the 
triggering function. Then Ackerman retails the fascinating details 
one: later transformations were in fact more democratic than that of 1787; thus it "seems 
morally bizarre, as well as legally inappropriate, to grant the Federalists the constitutional 
authority to lay down the rules for subsequent efforts to speak in the name of the People" (p. 
88). It is a subtle argument, not without problems: the Federalists had no moral or legal 
right to constrain the People to Article V amendments; but future transformations must ad­
here to their fivefold formula of non-Article V amendment 
50. Ackerman here elides the story of how Lincoln's limited, and practically ineffective, 
proclamation (freeing only those slaves inside rebel lines - thus not under Union control) 
became transformed by an increasingly Radical Republican Congress into the nationally abo­
litionist Thirteenth Amendment. See ERic FoNER, REcoNSTRUCTioN: AMERICA'S UNFIN­
ISHED REvoLUTION, 1863-1877, at 60-68 (1988). Instead, he interprets the amendment 
proposal as akin to the "institutional bandwagon ... generated at the Founding." P. 134. 
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behind southern ratification, rightly calling attention, for example, 
to "the mix of legal and translegal elements displayed in South Car­
olina," concluding it was "a classic case of unconventional adapta­
tion" (p. 148 ). Finally came consolidation in the form of 
presidential and secretary of state proclamations (pp. 150-57 ). 
Once again, Ackerman succeeds in demonstrating that fundamental 
constitutional change occurred at a crisis moment in American his­
tory and not by strict adherence to written procedures. 
There were for Ackerman two procedural innovations distin­
guishing the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. First was pres­
idential leadership, allowing him to "claim that a national election 
amounted to a constitutional mandate from the People" and to 
"lead[ ] other deliberative institutions to give their assent to . . .  his 
claim that the People have spoken" (p. 157 ). Here, Ackerman re­
minds us that there were, effectively, two Reconstructions: Presi­
dential and Congressional. (Among other virtues, this model sets 
the stage for the New Deal. ) Second, the process was "more 
nation-centered" than that of 1787 (p. 157 ). Reconstruction dealt 
the states a blow, not least to their role in making unconventional 
amendments. s1 
The story of the Fourteenth Amendment is one of congressional 
leadership. Congress's exclusion of the white South from its halls, 
and Johnson's vetoes of Radical legislation, signaled another phase 
of higher lawmaking. Then the Radical Republicans proposed the 
Amendment. The Radical landslide victory in the 1866 midterm 
election triggered fundamental change, bringing to Washington a 
"convention-like" Congress, meaning that "its perceived legitimacy 
reside[ d] primarily in its appeal to the ideal of popular sovereignty, 
rather than its established legality" (p. 168 ). Ackerman reads the 
proposal as placing political identity above racial identity in Ameri­
can culture (p.181 ), thus taking his stand with those who argue that 
the Radicals were dedicated to the ideal of racial equality and not 
just out to punish the "Slave Power."52 He also places the First and 
Second Reconstruction Acts alongside the Fourteenth Amendment 
as "triggering decisions - leaving it up to the (nationally defined ) 
People of each state to determine whether they would go along 
with the nation-centered enterprise of constitutional redefinition in­
itiated by the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 205 ). Then came ratifi­
cation. Here Ackerman does not accept the partially extorted state 
ratifications. Instead, he details various encounters between the 
51. Historians have long debated how much Reconstruction altered federalism. Compare 
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
5 CoNN. L. REv. 368 (1972-73), with WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FouRTEENTI-1 AMENDMENT 
(1988). 
52. Ackerman makes this clear in a footnote clainiing that "Americans can transcend 
their racist instincts in response to the ideal of equal citizenship." P. 164, n.*. 
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three branches of the federal government (conflicts over imple­
menting Reconstruction,s3 the impeachment of President Johnson, 
congressional revocation of Supreme Court jurisdiction over habeas 
corpus cases,s4 etc.), with Congress's repeated victories functioning 
as ratification.ss In this non-Article V process, "the separation of 
powers was taking on a key role in the ratifying process formerly 
monopolized by the states" (p. 209). Finally, the 1868 elections and 
a newly "packed" Republican Supreme Court consolidated the 
amendment. The latter did so in the Slaughterhouse Cases. s6 Often 
these cases are read as eviscerating the national citizenship that 
Ackerman says the Radicals meant to establish, but his focus here is 
process not substance: the important fact was that "Slaughterhouse 
effectively ended all serious legal debate on the validity of the Four­
teenth Amendment" (p. 246). What the Court made of them is an­
other matter; Ackerman promises to elaborate judicial "synthesis" 
in Interpretations (p. 251). 
The New Deal confronts Ackerman with his greatest challenge. 
The "professional narrative" of that era is based on a "myth of 
rediscovery" (pp. 7, 259) that the Court finally abandoned the ille­
gitimate review of economic regulation symbolized by Lochner v. 
New Yorks1 and returned to a grand, Marshallian vision of federal 
power. This was, understandably, the story legal reformers told at 
the time. But it is historically incorrect and trivializes the revolu­
tionary acceptance of the welfare state. It is especially important, 
thinks Ackerman, to recover this transformation now, because 
"[w]ith the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, New Deal 
premises are an object of sharp legislative critique" (p. 258). Such 
fears date poorly; still, the People, or some portion of them, may 
someday decide to alter those premises. In any case, Ackerman's 
procedural point is that "[s]o long as America remains a dualist de­
mocracy, the death of a generation does not consign its constitu­
tional achievements to the junk heap" (p. 258). These 
achievements, once again, were not funneled through Article V 
amendments. This time, "amendment-analogues" (p. 270) came in 
the form of extraordinary judicial decisions: "They memorialize the 
rare determinations of a massive and sustained conversation by the 
American people. These transformative precedents have, and 
53. See, e.g., The Co=and of the Army Act, ch. 170, 14 Stat. 485 (1867); The Tenure of 
Offices Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867). 
54. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868). 
55. Pp. 207-34. "Both [the President and Supreme Court] executed brilliant 'switches in 
time,' retreating before impeachment and jurisdiction-stripping in ways that saved them from 
permanent damage." P. 211. 
56. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
57. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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should have, a special status in the legal conversation. Since law­
yers did not make them, lawyers cannot unmake them" (p. 3 76). 
Article V was not the means for this constitutional revolution. 
Instead, "[t]he New Dealers took a more nation-centered course -
using a series of national electoral victories as mandates that ulti­
mately induced all three branches of the national government to 
recognize that the People had endorsed activist national govern­
ment" (p. 269). First, the Depression transformed the national elec­
tion of 1932 into a "signaling election" (p. 281). Then came the New 
Deal proposal in the form of "corporatist legislation" that 
Ackerman claims would have "abolished market capitalism" and 
replaced it with business management, under "Presidential leader­
ship."58 Fortunately, the "Old Court" would not go along. Its re­
jection of the early New Deal, in Ackerman's narrative, played a 
constructive role of informing the People what was going on in 
Washington and forcing the New Dealers to rethink their approach 
to economic regulation. Hence the second New Deal: "Rather 
than seeking to displace the competitive market with the NIRA, 
Roosevelt and Congress now accepted the market as a legitimate 
part of the emerging economic order - so long as regulatory struc­
tures could be introduced to correct abuses and injustices defined 
through the democratic process" (p. 302). This "more refined" pro­
posal, entailing a "revolutionary redefinition of the citizen's rela­
tionship to the nation-state," was the main issue in the triggering 
election of 1936 between Roosevelt and Alf Landon, an election 
that forced the People "to focus on fundamentals" (pp. 306, 309). 
FDR and the Democrats were free to alter the constitutional order 
- provided the Court allowed them to do so. Here is where the 
court-packing plan and congressional proposals for formal amend­
ment enter the story. There was, Ackerman claims, broad support 
for both (consolidation). Only when the Court "switched" and up­
held the second New Deal programs did popular support for coer­
cion abate; "the spokesmen for the People in both Congress and the 
White House quite re�sonably gave the Court a second chance to 
redeem its continued democratic legitimacy without imposing har­
sher measures in the form of court-packing or an Article Five 
amendment."59 The Court complied: consolidation continued 
apace, accelerating when an unprecedented third term allowed 
FDR to pack the Court the old fashioned way.60 
58. P. 286. This is a questionable interpretation of the "first" New Deal. 
59. P. 343. For a different interpretation of the New Deal Supreme Court, emphasizing 
doctrinal evolution over revolution, see BARRY CusHMAN, RETHINKING TiiE NEW DEAL 
COURT (1998). 
60. Ackerman refers to this change in Court membership as the second half of the two­
phase process of constitutional "transvaluation." P. 372. Compare CusHMAN, supra note 59. 
May 1999] Constitutional Process 1535 
Missing from this rethinking of the New Deal is legal realism. 
Ackerman equates realism with negative criticism; lacking any af­
firmative program, the realists offer little help to the progressive 
legal thinker today. In particular, he blames the realists for the 
"myth of rediscovery" that has obscured the New Deal's constitu­
tional creativity. But an unwillingness to accept the legal realist 
story of the 1930s should not blind one to the role that realism 
played in the constitutional transformation of that time - whether 
characterized as a dramatic switch, a thirty-year doctrinal evolution, 
and/or a generational shift on the Supreme Court. Realism, in 
short, supplied not just an interpretation of New Deal constitution­
alism; it was constitutive of it. Ackerman tells the story well: 
For twentieth-century critics of laissez-faire, the common law was the 
problem, not the solution: its vision of property, contract, and tort 
had created a false vision of economic freedom - ignoring the ques­
tions of distributive injustice, monopoly power, and other market fail­
ures that condemned millions to poverty and exploitation. Rather 
than genuflecting before this common law vision, the New Dealers 
sought to create a new foundation for economic freedom through 
democratic politics and legislative reform. [p. 370] 
There is no citation in this paragraph to any primary or secondary 
source. Perhaps one can now take silent scholarly notice of realism 
- but not at the same time criticize realists for failing to supply a 
positive vision. For the attack on common law ideology, along with 
an irreverent posture, came from Progressive legal thought gener­
ally and legal realism in particular.61 What effect it had on the 
People at large is more difficult to gauge. A place to start may be 
with Thurman Arnold: law professor, New Deal administrator, an­
titrust activist, and popular author.62 There are, after all, institu­
tions other than national elections through which to influence 
public opinion and by which public opinion exerts influence. Get-
61. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 
(1992); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 13-22 (1996); Note, 
The New Deal Court: Emergence of a New Reason, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1973, 2008-14 (1990). 
Earlier in the book Ackerman states that "New Deal doubts about Article Five reflected the 
larger pragmatic revolt against formalism that had swept through much of American culture 
during the early twentieth century," and admits that realists "expressed similar doubts, but it 
is a mistake to exaggerate their direct role in this affair. The academics with the greatest 
influence on Roosevelt - men like Frankfurter or Edward Corwin - were not Realists in 
any narrow sense, but they were pragmatists." Pp. 347, 486 n.3. This is again a top-down 
approach to the New Deal, and even on its own terms has problems: Frankfurter's "general 
preference for the amendment route and his opposition to '[court-]packing' were well 
known." Joseph P. Lash, A Brahmin of the Law, in FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX 
FRANKFURTER 59 (1974). 
62. See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937); THE SYMBOLS OF 
GOVERNMENT {1935). Of the leading realists, Arnold has perhaps been least well served by 
historians. A good place to start is THURMAN W. ARNOLD, FAIR Fimrrs AND FouL: A 
DISSENTING LAWYER'S LIFE {1965). 
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ting "beyond Realism"63 - as jurisprudence and history - may 
enlighten. Omitting realism from an account of the New Deal does 
not. 
Ackerman applauds the substance of the New Deal constitu­
tional revolution but has reservations about its modes. From the 
perspective of constitutional process, a presidentially led, judicially 
effected, non-Article V amendment-analogue offers too simple a 
means for unscrupulous Presidents to alter the Constitution by fill­
ing the Supreme Court with ideological Justices - what might be 
called actuarial court-packing. This has been attempted, Ackerman 
claims, most recently in the Reagan-Bush era, and it has led to "the 
hyperpoliticization of the Supreme Court" (p. 415). He does not, 
however, suggest sticking to Article V. Instead, he concludes 
Transformations by recommending a statutory amendment process, 
"the Popular Sovereignty Initiative": 
Proposed by a (second-term) President, this Initiative should be sub­
mitted to Congress for two-thirds approval, and should then be sub­
mitted to the voters at the next two Presidential elections. If it passes 
these tests, it should be accorded constitutional status by the Supreme 
Court. [p. 415] 
This procedure preserves the role of Presidential signaling (a posi­
tive legacy of FDR's higher lawmaking), a crucial role for Congress, 
and part of both Article V and the Reconstruction experience -
while avoiding the need for ratification by three-fourths of the 
states. Demoted during Reconstruction, they deserve a lesser role 
in the amending process. 
For the most part, Transformations complements Foundations. 
But in one important sense the two volumes differ: the author's 
attitude toward the People's unconventional power that is central 
to his story. Foundations was published in 1991 and Ackerman was 
skeptical of the political atmosphere in which he wrote. He spoke 
of Ronald Reagan's attempts at "transformative Supreme Court ap­
pointments," "President Bush's proposal of a flag-burning amend­
ment," and warned of "false positives" and "false negatives" when 
testing for the five elements of legitimate change. 64 In short, 
Ackerman stressed how rare constitutional moments are and con­
cluded that there was not one in the 1980s. In the final pages, he 
recommended an unamendable Bill of Rights, like that in the post­
war German Basic Law. True, even unamendable rights might not 
be safe. 
Nonetheless, entrenching the Bill might make the triumph of a Nazi­
like movement more difficult. It would serve as a reminder to all fu-
63. REcoNSTRUcrING, supra note 7, at 72. 
64. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 51, 320, 278-80. 
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ture generations of a time when Americans solemnly recommitted the 
nation to the unconditional protection of fundamental rights . . . .  
I myself would be proud to be a member of the generation that 
took this burden upon itself - finally redeeming the promise of the 
Declaration of Independence by entrenching inalienable rights into 
our Constitution.65 
In Transformations, Ackerman remains cautious about the pop­
u1ar amending process, but is in the end more hopeful about and 
supportive of constitutional change. What happened between 1991 
and today? Mr. Dooley might have had an answer.66 Whatever the 
cause, Ackerman now is not just an archeologist of popu1ar sover­
eignty; he is also a (qualified) champion of it. He remains a dualist, 
but thesis and antithesis are closer together now than then, which 
may just be the logic of such things. 
B. Amar's (Nouvelle) Federalism 
Where Ackerman rides the high track of constitutional politics, 
Amar follows its twists and turns, surveying where the Founders 
tried to lead the nation and where the Supreme Court has redi­
rected it. In part I, a revision of an earlier article entitled The Bill 
of Rights as a Constitution,67 his goal is nothing less than to tum the 
conventional wisdom about the Bill of Rights on its head. He 
shou1d succeed. Amar argues that the original ten amendments 
were not intended solely, or even primarily, to defend individual 
rights. Instead, they were designed to elaborate and qualify the 
structural principles of the Constitution. Most important was feder­
alism: the Bill was supposed to maintain the power of the states 
relative to the federal govemment.68 
To frame his case, Amar quotes James Madison in Federalist 51 
- "[i]t is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the 
society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of 
65. Id. at 320-21. 
66. Cf. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DooLEY AT His BEST 77 (Elmer Ellis ed., 1938) 
(observing after the Insular Cases that "th' Supreme Coort follows th' iliction returns"). 
67. 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). 
68. Charles Black Jr., has long argued for structural interpretations of the Constitution. 
CHARLES BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). Still, 
no one has conveyed the message about the (Anti-) Federalist Bill with as much power and 
sustained analysis as Amar. The fundamentally federal nature of the 1787 Constitution (in­
cluding the Bill of Rights) has received new, powerful support from a host of early American 
historians. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP­
MENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES 0F THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES (1986); 
JACK N. RAKoVE, ORIGINAL MEAN!NGs: PoLmcs AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CON­
STITUTION (1996); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, 4 vols. (1986-93); Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1215 (1990). 
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the society against the injustice of the other part"69 - and argues 
that 
[t]he conventional understanding of the Bill seems to focus almost 
exclusively on the second issue (protection of minority against major­
ity) while ignoring the first (protection of the people against self­
interested government). Yet as I shall show, this first issue was in­
deed first in the minds of those who framed the Bill of Rights. [p. xiii) 
As Amar enjoins, "first things first" (p. 3). Does it matter that 
Madison in Federalist 51 was not thinking about the Bill of Rights 
(which did not yet exist)? Perhaps not, if he was discussing the 
rights of majorities and minorities at a sufficiently abstract level. 
Primarily, though, in this essay Madison sought to show that the 
federal government, much more than the state governments, 
obeyed the salutary principle of separated powers, which would 
prevent one institution within it from predominating - in particu­
lar, the legislature. The "vices of the political system of the United 
States," as Madison entitled his survey of the states and 
Confederation,70 made him fearful of legislatures. His goal in 51 
was to explain how legislative will would be diluted and checked, 
not to celebrate majoritarian democr:acy. 
Just after the sentence in Federalist 51 that Amar quotes, 
Madison explained how the structure of the federal government 
(again, not the Bill of Rights) would check the majority: "Different 
interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a major­
ity be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will 
be insecure." He saw two ways to protect minorities. The first was 
to create a hereditary ruler, embodying "a will in the community 
independent of the majority." The second was to "comprehend[ ] 
in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will 
render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very im­
probable . . . .  "71 The latter was the way of the federal Constitution. 
He was elaborating his argument in Federalist 10 that a large repub­
lic mitigated the problem of factional majorities throughout the 
whole and applying the same logic to institutional competition 
within the federal government. Hence the bicameral, not unicam­
eral, legislature. In addition, "[a]s the weight of the legislative au­
thority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the 
executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. 
An absolute negative on the legislature, appears, at first view, to be 
the natural defence with which the executive magistrate should be 
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
70. "Vices of tbe Political System of the United States," 9 THE PAPERS oF JAMES 
MAo1soN 345-58 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975). For a reconsideration of Madison's 
influence on the Founding, see Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REv. 
611 (1999). 
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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armed." Madison had failed to get such a veto included at 
Philadelphia; in Federalist 51 he proposed (as an amendment?) a 
veto council composed of the President and Senators.n So much 
for using Federalist 51 to frame a majoritarian interpretation of any 
part of the Constitution. . 
However decontextualized his quotation, Amar is on to some­
thing. He might have used Madison's Federalist 10 and 51 to make 
an even stronger case that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect 
the states (or localities) more than minorities had he contrasted 
them with any number of anti-Federalist criticisms of the new Con­
stitution as a threat to local control over government.73 In this jux­
taposition, the Bill was, as conventional wisdom has it, designed to 
remedy the weaknesses of the Constitution. But rather than pro­
tect minority interests, it was supposed to protect more familiar in­
stitutions - state and local - from the new, distant, and purposely 
elitist federal government. To push this interpretation farther, 
there may be more protection of minorities (economic and re­
gional) in the main body of the Constitution than in the Bill of 
Rights. But this would require revisionism on a scale quite beyond 
even that of Amar's. 
Similarly, Amar is right to emphasize the importance of the jury 
in eighteenth-century America. For him, the jury connotes local­
ism, fear of distant decisionmakers, populism, and majority rule. 
He is right about the first two. In a constitutional history of the 
British Empire, the American Revolution, and early United States, 
it would be hard to exaggerate the jury; it was a metaphor for local­
ism, due process, and open lawmaking and enforcement. Eben 
Moglen reminds us that there was a "cluster" of rights associated 
with the jury, many not individual but rather communal rights.74 
Amar drives this theme home effectively. Too effectively. Localism 
is not - at least, was not in the eighteenth century - the same as 
populism or majoritarianism. The latter words were foreign to both 
Federalists and anti-Federalists, few of whom were democrats.75 
Nor was it identical to the province or state, notwithstanding 
72. Id. at 351-52. See also Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARv. L. REv. 
611, 627-36. 
73. See generally 1 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (1981). 
74. See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1086, 1114 (1994); see also WILLIAM E. 
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE CoMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON 
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975). 
75. Amar enjoins lawyers to study "the lessons of the 'republican revival,'" which he 
equates with majoritarian government. P. 302. But see BERNARD BAILYN, THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 282 (1967) (noting that '"democ­
racy' ... was generally associated with the threat of civil disorder and the early assumption of 
power by a dictator"). 
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Amar's repeated equation of "local" with "state."76 Instead, it con­
noted a jurisdiction smaller :;ind more manageable. The social poli­
tics in these places were quite complex, varying widely across space 
and through time, but few historians would characterize them as 
populist; rather, they would talk of deference society, some of oli­
garchy, others of violent subcultures defying simple characteriza­
tion.77 Whatever the nature of the Revolution, the constitutional 
debate certainly was about who should rule at home - and the 
boundaries of that home. 
So the jury deserves a closer look. As those most familiar with 
law enforcement in early America have noted, the ideal of the jury 
trial had its limits. When it came to everyday crime, the jury was 
seen by provincial legislative houses as obstructionist - as it was by 
imperial eyes in gubernatorial forts, Council chambers, and in 
Whitehall. Thus colonial legislatures became innovators in the 
business of summary jurisdiction: quick, efficient criminal process, 
without juries.78 To risk too fine a point, what was good enough for 
urban rowdies, slaves, and frontier squatters was not good enough 
for transatlantic merchants and substantial land speculators. 
Of course, these "lawless" elements could invoke the jury, too. 
For them, the jury functioned as a safety valve against both imperial 
and provincial jurisdiction, vindicating interests as local as those of 
a family.79 Some of them helped ensure that the jury was guaran­
teed in several state constitutions (a point worth revisiting), though 
colonial summary justice endured written constitution-making in­
tact.80 Intraprovincial jurisdictional politics (for lack of a better 
phrase), like imperial-provincial jurisdictional politics, was a real 
phenomenon, though undertheorized and also unnamed. After the 
Revolution, the latter received a name (federalism); the former did 
not. By framing the controversy as the federal government (and 
the People) versus the states, the Federalists (in part accidentally) 
eliminated local government from the articulate debates over the 
Constitution. Yet local units remained important parts of the gov­
ernmental order. Unfortunately, the fate of this intraprovincial fed-
76. On the contemporary ambiguity of "state," see J.R. Pole, The Politics of the Word 
"State" and its Relation to American Sovereignty, 8 PARLIAMENTS, EsTATES AND REPRESEN­
TATION 1 (1988). 
77. A convenient overview is PoUTics AND SocIETY IN COLONIAL AMERICA: DEMOC­
RACY OR DEFERENCE? (Michael G. Kammen ed., 1967). 
78. See Juuus GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CoLO· 
NIAL New YoRK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) 379-83 (1970); Moglen, 
supra note 74, at 1105-11. 
79. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Imperia in Imperio: The Multiple Constitutions of Empire 
in New York, 1750-1777, 16 LAW & HIST. RBv. 319, 350-54 (1998). 
80. See, e.g., Jackson ex dem. Wood v. Wood, 2 Cow. 819 (N.Y. 1824) (upholding special 
sessions trial for petit larceny without indictment or jury because colonial practice was incor­
porated into the state constitution). 
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eralism remains one of the under examined mysteries of the 
American Revolution and the early United States.81 In the consti­
tutional debate, local government was the dog that did not bark. 
Or did it? Amar inadvertently permits us to listen again. When 
anti-Federalists championed the jury, the militia, church establish­
ments, and so forth, many meant to protect the states, certainly, but 
some also hoped to vindicate those familiar local worlds. This is 
what makes Amar's work so intriguing. He comes close to redis­
covering those worlds in Chapter Three, on "The Military Amend­
ments." There he argues that "the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms" for purposes of "a well regulated Militia'' was a "states' -
right," not an individual right (p. 52). Given the choice, he is more 
correct than not. But he acknowledges that "this chain of argument 
has some weak links" (p. 52). The same language appears in sev­
eral state constitutions, suggesting that the militias and arms­
bearing were not fully controlled by the states. While state govern­
ments could (as the federal government could) organize and disci­
pline militias in emergencies, they too lacked the power to disarm 
their members (p. 52). It is to Amar's credit that he concedes 
problems with a "states' -rights" reading of the Second Amendment. 
But he declines his own invitation to explore how the militia actu­
ally functioned. It has its historians, and they tell us that it was a 
local institution - which is to say, more often than not, organized 
by elites at the most local level, county or town.82 The state-versus­
individual model fails to capture these provincial sociopolitics. 
Which brings us back to anti-Federalist worship of the jury. 
Time and again anti-Federalists criticized the Constitution for not 
specifying that criminal jury trials would be held in the vicinage of 
the alleged crime and failing to guarantee the jury trial in federal 
81. Excellent exceptions include HENDRIK HARTOG, Ptmuc PROPERTY AND PRIVATE 
POWER: THE CoRPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 
(1983), and WILLIAM J. NovAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY .AMERICA (1996). For an analysis of local government in practice, 
see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1990), and Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II - Localism and 
Legal Theory, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 346 (1990). 
82. The jealous localism of these outfits was the bane of a string of imperial commanders 
- from British commanders in chief to George Washington - and one of the reasons why 
the federal government was given the power to raise an army. See LAWRENCE D. CRESs, 
CITIZENS IN ARMs: THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA IN AMERICAN SocIETY TO THE WAR OF 
1812 (1982); JAMES KIRBY MARTIN & MARK EDWARD LENDER, A REsPECTABLE ARMY: 
THE MILITARY ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89 (1982); JoHN P. REID, IN DEFIANCE OF 
THE LAw: THE STANDING-ARMY CoNTROVERSY, THE Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COM­
ING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1981); JOHN SHY, A PEOPLE NUMEROUS AND ARMED: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE MILITARY STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 23-33 (1976); 
JOHN SHY, TOWARD LEXINGTON: THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE COMING OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3-20 (1965); Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America: 
The Regulation of Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAW & HIST. REv. 567, 589 (1998); 
Louis Morton, The Origins of American Military Policy, 22 MIL. AFF. 75 (1958). 
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civil trials at all. Hamilton responded to the latter complaint in 
Federalist 83 by surveying the state legal systems. He pointed out 
that "there is a material diversity as well in the modification as in 
the extent of the institution of trial by jury in civil cases in the sev­
eral states."83 In light of this diversity, the Constitutional 
Convention could not have created a general rule consistent with all 
the state systems. Hamilton treated state proposals for a jury 
amendment as unworkable and unwise. Such an amendment was 
unworkable because it might require the federal courts to alter their 
use of juries as they circulated among the states: "The capricious 
operation of so dissimilar a method of trial in the same cases, under 
the same government, is of itself sufficient to indispose every well 
regulated judgment towards it."84 It was also unwise, for "there are 
many cases in which the trial by jury is an ineligible one":85 for 
example, diplomatic cases, those involving the law of nations, prize, 
and equity. Perhaps the Convention might have used "one state as 
a model for the whole," but in the end it was thought best to leave 
the "arduous" task of devising a uniform plan to "the discretion of 
the legislature."86 
Anti-Federalists got their jury amendments: the Sixth guaran­
teed a local jury in criminal cases, the Seventh declared that "In 
Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury should be pre­
served. "87 It would seem that this compromissary language ignored 
the difficulty Hamilton and others pointed out, that there was 
among the states no standard against which to determine when and 
how to use the jury in federal civil trials. Amar concludes that the 
Seventh Amendment was designed to incorporate that diversity: 
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 566 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
84. Id. at 567 (referring to the proposal of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention). 
85. Id. at 568. 
86. See id. at 566-67; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton); JAMES 
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 630, 647 (1966), 
The jury trial provision evoked little discussion in Philadelphia, reaching the table late in the 
proceedings. For a shrewd foreshadowing of Hamilton's logic, which soon became conven­
tional Federalist wisdom, see the comments of James Wilson several montlls earlier at the 
Pennsylvania ratification convention. See James Wilson, Address at tlle Convention of the 
State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 7, 1787) in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNVEN· 
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 486, 488 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d 
ed. 1937) [hereinafter DEBATES]; James Wilson, Address at a Public Meeting in the Penn­
sylvania State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787) in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HisTORY OF TIIE RATIFI· 
CATION oF THE CONSTITUTION 339, 340-31 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1981 ); see also Thomas Dawes, Address at the Convention of tlle State of Massachusetts (Jan. 
30, 1788) in 2 DEBATES, supra, at 113, 114; James Iredell, Address at the Convention of the 
State of NortlI Carolina (July 28, 1788), in 4 DEBATES, supra, at 144, 144-45 (relying on Mr. 
Spaight's comments regarding jury trials in civil cases); id. (July 29, 1788), in 4 DEBATES, 
supra, at 164, 165-66; James Madison, Address at the Convention of the State of Virginia 
(June 20, 1788), in 3 DEBATES, supra, at 531, 534-35; Charles Pinckney, Address at the Con­
vention of tlle State of South Carolina (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 DEBATES, supra, 253, 260. 
87. U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. 
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the federal courts were to employ the jury, or not, as state law 
where they sat dictated, notwithstanding administrative inefficien­
cies. In short, the Founders intended federal courts to follow a "dy­
namic" approach to procedure (pp. 89-93) like that now used for 
substantive law under Erie. There is evidence that a few anti­
Federalists did indeed assume that jury trials in the federal courts 
would fluctuate with location.88 But most did not give too much 
thought to how the guarantee would operate in practice. As 
George Mason, a Virginia anti-Federalist, said in Philadelphia, the 
diversity of state practice meant that "jury cases can not be speci­
fied. A general principle laid down on this and some other points 
would be sufficient."89 The key, as always, was the principle of the 
jury; here, as with those "other" principles, practical operation was 
ignored. It is difficult to conclude, with Amar, that a "dynamic" 
approach to the civil jury is most faithful. Many agreed with 
Hamilton that Congress should determine a standard form.90 It 
never did. Instead, the Supreme Court, per Justice Joseph Story, 
laid down a historical test that looked to English practice in 1791,91 
when the amendment was adopted - an option no one discussed at 
that time. But this fitted Justice Story's transcendental, Anglocen­
tric conception of the common law, which served a variety of intel­
lectual and political purposes in antebellum America.92 Federalist 
politics inspired in Hamilton and others a moment of positivist ap­
prehension of the common law, but a generation later the nature of 
those politics had changed and so too the attitude of Federalist leg­
atees toward the common law.93 
Amar might agree that intrastate localism was an important ele­
ment in the original constitutional order, but this would not affect 
his analysis of Reconstruction. The point of Part II of his book is 
88. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 51 
MINN. L. REv. 639, 712-13 (1973). 
89. MADISON, supra note 86, at 630. 
90. See Wilson, Address at the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, supra note 86, at 
488; Wilson, Address at a Public Meeting in the Pennsylvania State House Yard supra note 
86, at 344; see also Dawes, supra note 86, at 114; Iredell, Address at the Convention of the 
State of North Carolina (July 28, 1788), supra note 86, at 144-45; id. (July 29, 1788), supra 
note 86, at 165-66; Madison, supra note 86, at 534-35; Pinckney, supra note 86, at 260. 
91. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
92. The best study of these dynamics remains PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE Mrno IN 
AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CrviL WAR 99-265 (1965). 
93. There are many moments of positivist perception of the co=on law scattered 
throughout Anglo-American history. Rarely mere intellectual epiphanies, they arise instead 
amidst concrete political controversies - or, more accurately, operate as arguments within 
those controversies. Cf. Ackerman, Transformations, at 370-72; Amar, supra note 9, at 694-
95; Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 
110 HARV. L. REv. 1785, 1786 (1997) (arguing that "Erie-effects" are "product[s] of a certain 
respect for democratic authority"); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fi­
delity and Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 395, 426-32 (1995) (discussing Justice Holmes's repudia­
tion of Justice Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)). 
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that the Reconstruction amendments demoted federalism, the 
states, and implicitly all local units in the constitutional order. Here 
is where the individualist connotation of the Bill of Rights emerged. 
In short, the Founder's structural Bill became our minorities­
protective Bill; states' rights became individual rights. No longer 
partners in an ambiguous division of governmental duties, the states 
were subordinated in the constitutional hierarchy, and the federal 
government defined the rights of federal citizenship.94 
The shift was not as stark as all that. Amar nicely describes how 
the more individualistic interpretation enjoyed an underground life 
during the antebellum period.95 Always latent, it came out of reces­
sion and into dominance with the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments. 
Having traced the structure-to-rights transformation, Amar 
turns to the issue of whether the framers of Reconstruction in­
tended to incorporate the first ten amendments against the states. 
In a subtle theory of "refined incorporation," Amar argues that 
some should be incorporated and some should not. In any case, the 
vehicle should be the Privileges and Immunities Clause, not the 
Due Process Clause, for Amar argues that the crux of 
Reconstruction was the redefinition of national citizenship. In de­
termining whether this or that right is a privilege of national citizen­
ship, he embraces neither the "traditions of · English liberty" 
approach associated with Justice Felix Frankfurter nor the total in­
corporation approach of Justice Hugo Black. He instead asks 
whether a particular protection "is a personal privilege - that is, a 
private right - of individual citizens, rather than a right of states or 
the public at large" (p. 22 1 ). If the latter, then it seems to him con­
tradictory to apply the states'-right against the states. But if it is an 
individual right, or a structural right that was transformed into an 
individual right, then it should be incorporated against the states. 
The most interesting example of the last sort is the First 
Amendment's prohibition against religious establishments. Many 
states had established churches in 1789; the fear behind the Estab­
lishment Clause was that the federal government might erect a na­
tional church similar to the Church of England. Amar nicely calls it 
"a home rule - local option provision" (p. 246 ). Thus it is, from an 
originalist perspective, illogical to incorporate the clause, as it was 
supposed to protect some state establishments.96 But Amar argues 
94. For a similar earlier interpretation, see Kaczorowski, supra note 51, at 398 (arguing 
that the Fourteenth Amendment "wrought nothing less than a revolution in American feder· 
alism" and enlarged the civil rights guaranteed by national citizenship). 
95. See also William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Anti-Slavery Movement Upon Styles of 
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1974). 
96. See Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitll· 
tional, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2347 (1997). 
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that the disestablishment of state churches by Reconstruction and 
the prohibition of establishments in the Western territories together 
transformed constitutional attitudes toward religion: there was fear 
of any state favoritism toward particular denominations. This was 
not because of declining religiosity; perhaps just the opposite. The 
splintering of old denominations and creation of new ones in­
creased mutual suspicions. In a perfect world, some denominations 
would have liked state support. In early national America, how­
ever, better that the state remain neutral.97 
Incorporating "the freedom of speech, or of the press," is easier. 
It was from the beginning a mixed right, of states (relating to parlia­
mentary privileges) and individuals (for example, the right to peti­
tion).98 The rights interpretation spread in reaction to Southern 
suppression of abolitionist literature and reached the Congressional 
Record in the 1860s (pp. 235-39). But again Amar's analysis is too 
neat. While exploring the intersection of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, he looks ahead one hundred years to justify modern 
free speech doctrine. In particular, he must confront "the doctrinal 
rules crafted by Sullivan and its progeny [that] reflect obvious suspi­
cion of juries - resulting, for example, in various issues being clas­
sified as legal questions or mixed questions of law and fact 
inappropriate for unconstrained jury determination." (p. 243). 
Where has the jury gone? 
Once the Fourteenth Amendment is on the books, the agency theory 
of free speech is less explanatory than the minority-protection theory, 
for the latter better accounts for speech limitations on majoritarian 
state legislatures. And the minority-protection theory suggests a dif­
ferent optimal allocation between judge and jury. [p. 244] 
This is quite a jump and leaves out much history of the relationship 
between judge and jury in American law.99 And why is Amar cer­
tain that judges are more competent guardians of rights than juries? 
He never explains; he might assume that it has something to do 
with the different origins, socialization, and peer group of those 
who rise to the bench compared to those in the jury box. But this 
sort of history resides in sources largely outside those he explores 
- largely, but not completely, for such reasoning is similar to 
Hamilton's celebration of a cosmopolitan judiciary in Federalist 78, 
81, 82, and 83. 
97. See NATiiAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 
(1989). This attitude began in some colonies before the Revolution. See Perry G.E. Miller, 
The Contribution of the Protestant Churches to the Religious Liberty in Colonial America, 2 
HARV. REv. 60, 69 (1964). 
98. Though this too was a mixed individual and state right. See Gregory A. Mark, The 
Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 2153, 2178-87 (1998). 
99. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 74, at 165-74. 
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Finally, Amar claims that the individualistic interpretation of 
the Bill is a product of Reconstruction. But most of the cases cited 
to prove this date much later, the most important after 1890, mak­
ing for a long Reconstruction moment.100 More importantly, 
Amar's three-level institutional framework - nation, state, and in­
dividual - makes it difficult to see other ways to interpret the con­
stitutional shift of the late nineteenth century. As with the lack of 
focus on local government at the Founding, the automatic move 
from state to individual misses other actors: groups located be­
tween the state and the individual. Amar writes that "between 1775 
and 1866 the poster boy of arms morphed from the Concord min­
uteman to the Carolina freedman" (p. 266; emphasis added). But 
was that Carolina freedman a single, rights-bearing individual? Or 
did his right (assuming Amar is correct that he had one1°1) depend 
on a different but still collective identity, namely, as a newly liber­
ated African American in the deep South? The problem here par­
allels that of equating the local with the state at the Founding. In 
short, is the story of the Bill of Rights from Reconstruction to the 
present really about individual rights?102 Would not an account 
that emphasized solicitude for groups help explain both the 
Slaughterhouse Cases103 as well as those overruling them, including 
Santa Clara County, standing for the proposition that corporations 
were constitutional people too?104 Instead, Amar's iconoclastic 
narrative turns back toward the conventional wisdom. Only the 
dates were wrong. Having corrected those, his story becomes famil­
iar: "the Reconstruction generation - not their Founding fathers 
100. By the 1890s, this rhetorical trickle had swelled into a steady stream of references 
to the "first ten amendments . . .  in the nature of a bill of rights" to protect "persons and 
property" and "unalienable rights" . . . . Gone was the view, publicly expressed by 
Supreme Court Justice Samuel F. Miller as late as 1880, that "our Constitution, unlike 
most modem ones, does not contain any formal declaration or bill of rights." 
Pp. 287-88 (first omission in original, endnotes omitted). 
101. See RobertJ. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to Be Applied to the 
White Population": Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity - The Redeemed South's Leg­
acy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1307 (1995). 
102. See AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 80-101 (1995); Owen M. Fiss, 
The Supreme Court 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 
(1979); Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 599, 604-13 (1979); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980). 
103. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). Herbert Hovenkamp illuminates the background to these cases in 
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 117-24 (1991). 
104. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). The emergence 
of the "real entity" theory of the corporation was actually a gradual process in the late 19th 
century. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate The­
ory, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 173 (1985-86); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business 
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441 (1987); see also Robert J. 
Kaczorowski, Reflections on Monell v. Department of Services, URB. LAW. (forthcoming 
1999) (arguing that "the conclusion [in MonellJ that [the Reconstruction] Congress intended 
municipal corporations to be sued under sec. 1983 is far from compelling"). 
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or grandfathers - took a crumbling and somewhat obscure edifice, 
placed it on new, high ground, and remade it so that it truly would 
stand as a temple of liberty and justice for all" (p. 288). 
One can disagree with Amar's analysis of whether a particular 
right represents a state prerogative, a privilege or immunity of na­
tional citizenship, or a group right, but the theory of refined incor­
poration has much to offer. Also intriguing is his suggestion that 
the Bill be approached "holistically," rather than as "discrete blocks 
of text, with each segment examined in isolation" (pp. xi-xii). His­
torically this makes much sense; jurisprudentially, it may be based 
upon unreal expectations about how adjudication operates. In the 
end, Amar is not terribly concerned about the latter because he 
believes that "[s]elective incorporation is largely right in result and 
instinct," so that "today's judges and lawyers have often gotten it 
right without quite realizing why."105 He does not elaborate what 
he means here by "right" but implies that judges should interpret 
the amendments according to the historical meaning ascribed to 
their text when written, or in light of new meanings generated by 
subsequent constitutional experience similarly memorialized in 
text. He, like Ackerman, is engaged in a form of evolutionary 
originalism. Tue means and telos of this process is popular 
sovereignty. 
II. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
Despite the many differences between these books, popular sov­
ereignty is the dominant theme in both. In their collective constitu­
tional history, federalism becomes less important after the Civil 
War, and the separation of powers has always been a secondary 
theme. Popular sovereignty, on the other hand, was fundamental to 
the Constitution's creation, played a key role in its reconstruc­
tion( s ), and remains today the most important premise of American 
constitutionalism. Accordingly, "the People," as a heuristic device, 
does a lot of work in these histories, giving rise to moments of rhe­
torical populism.106 But this devotion to the People invites special 
scrutiny, not least because these books will most likely not be read 
by the people on the street.101 
105. P. 307. Amar notes that an exception is constitutional criminal procedure, the sub­
ject of another book. See p. 307 n.*; AKHn. REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMI­
NAL PROCEDURE: Fmsr PRINCIPLES (1997). 
106. See Ackerman p. x (stating in his acknowledgments that "I hope this book partially 
repays my enormous debt to the institutions, and the country, that made it possible"); Amar, 
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 
1043, n.t (1988) (dedicating article to his father who asked him to write something "for the 
people"). 
107. But see Amar p. 296 (stating that "this is a book written not just for lawyers and 
judges but for ordinary citizens who care about our Constitution"). 
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The persistence of the principle of popular sovereignty over two 
centuries does not mean that it conveys the same thing today as in 
1781.10s Ackerman and Amar realize this, and they try to show 
how the procedural mechanisms of popular sovereignty have 
changed over time. They assume that, substantively, popular sover­
eignty has always meant majoritarianism. Both are combatting the 
problem of the "countermajoritarian difficulty"109 (i.e, judicial re­
view) in constitutional studies in two ways. First, they shift focus 
away from the Supreme Court to other institutions. Second, they 
emphasize how profoundly majoritarian American constitutional­
ism is, so that one can see, with Alexander Hamilton, that judicial 
review is actually one more instrument of the people's will.11° 
Popular sovereignty, however, does not necessarily imply 
majoritarian democracy - whether monist or dualist; invocations 
of popular sovereignty have often been ambiguous, part devotion to 
the people, part interested rhetorical strategy.111 At the very least, 
the Founders, Federalist and anti-Federalist alike, were not simple 
majoritarians.112 The democratic connotation of popular sover­
eignty did not become widespread for decades after the Revolution 
and involved a massive constitutional transformation almost unno­
ticed in these books, perhaps because it took place at the state level. 
That history is associated with the Jacksonian era, but even then it 
resulted in a limited version of democracy, working toward univer­
sal white male suffrage, the abolition of property qualifications for 
elective office, and an increased number of elected officials.113 The 
trend resumed in the Progressive Era, which saw the extension of 
the vote to women (especially native-born white women), initiatives 
and referenda, and directly elected Senators. 
108. For an excellent study of the concept before 1787, see EDMUND S. MORGAN, 
!NvENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 
(1988). 
109. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
110. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) at 524-25 (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 
1961). 
111 .  See Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: 
PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948); MoRGAN, supra note 108; G. Edward White, Reading the 
Guarantee Clause, U. CoLO. L. R.Ev. 787 (1994) (criticizing Amar for equating popular sover­
eignty with majoritarianism). 
112. Amar embraces a much less complicated notion of majoritarianism than Ackerman. 
In addition to The Bill of Rights, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican­
ism: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. CoLo. L. 
R.Ev. 749 (1994). Still, both believe that American constitutional culture has been essentially 
majoritarian from its beginning. 
113. See DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1968); see also 
Morton J. Horwitz & Orlando de Campo, Wizen and How the Supreme Court Found Democ­
racy - A Computer Study, 14 QuINNIPIAC L.J. 1 (1994) (graphing the slow shift in judges' 
use of "democracy" in nineteenth and twentieth centuries). For brief references, see 
Ackerman p. 270; FoUNDATIONs, supra note 2, at 76-77. 
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To date, the constitutional history of Progressivism remains un­
written. When it is, Ackerman's compression of his third constitu­
tional moment to the 1930s may seem less persuasive - as Amar 
suggests in his afterword.114 Instead, constitutional development 
will be seen to have played out on a larger stage of social and intel­
lectual change, turning on the construction and legitimation of the 
administrative state. It is an interesting question, for example, how 
one might reconcile Ackerman's New Deal with that of legal histo­
rian Edward Purcell Jr.115 let alone that of social historian Lizabeth 
Cohen, to name just some who have helped excavate the 1930s. 
The people in Cohen's book, Making a New Deal, for example, do 
not look much like the People in Ackerman's. Cohen's people had 
racial, ethnic, class, regional, and other identities. They were not 
passive consumers of political debates, responding yea or nea to the 
calls from the federal capital. Instead, they absorbed media in a 
much more complicated manner, reinterpreting political news and a 
host of mass-distributed signs in unexpected ways.116 Maybe there 
was a "deeper" story being scripted in Washington, D.C., in 1936; 
but how was that text read? Did voters believe they were engaged 
in a referendum on a constitutional "amendment-analogue"? Quite 
plausibly many did. It is equally plausible that most voted along 
(literally) familiar party lines. Possibly many accepted FDR be­
cause he lived up to his promise to do something - though that 
something remained unrealized, unclear, and controversial - and 
that when others rejected Alf Landon they were rejecting Alf Lan­
don, not embracing a new constitutional paradigm. These explana­
tions are all probably true to some extent. To find out which are 
more true than others would require more research, in a wider vari­
ety of sources, than has hitherto been attempted. Court opinions, 
presidential speeches, and election returns will not carry the burden 
of proof.117 Perhaps it is a proposition that will not admit of histori­
cal proof - or disproof. That FDR was popular, and the Supreme 
Court's doctrine was not, and that the latter changed - somehow, 
at some point - and came into accord with the program of the 
114. See Amar p. 300 (surveying the Progressive amendments and asking whether it is 
"necessary to postulate an unwritten amendment in the 1930s to account for a more national­
ist and redistributive constitutional regime in the twentieth century"). 
115. See EDWARD A. PuRCELL JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC 
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM <;IF VALUE (1973). 
116. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 
1919-1939 (1990). 
117. Michael Kammen cleared some ground in A MACHINE THAT WouLD Go OF ITSELF. 
THE CoNSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CuLTURE 255-81 (1986). Ackerman applauds a study of 
public support for FDR's court-packing plan before and after the Supreme Court's "switch" 
in 1937, which indicates that a majority of the polled public approved the plan as a means to 
defeat judicial obstructionism. P. 324. But support for court-packing is not the same thing as 
support for a de facto constitutional amendment. 
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former, is enough for Ackerman. Constitutional change happened; 
therefore the People willed it to happen. He is interested in the 
political process - the constitutional process - of unconventional 
amendment, not the cultural conflict behind it, so he can be for­
given for leaving out from what is already a substantial undertaking 
the sort of close historical analysis necessary to explain a shift in 
constitutional meaning. The problem is that his method of research 
and argumentation bear an uncertain relation to his ultimate claim 
that the People, en masse, participated in the process. 
To bolster his cultural history of the Constitution, Ackerman 
uses a literary technique increasingly found in legal scholarship: the 
fictitious voice.118 In Ackerman's case, it speaks in a monologue: 
"the Prophetic Voice" of We the People. This device is new to Vol­
ume 2 and is meant to be critical. But unlike most law review dra­
matis personae, Ackerman's lacks irony. The People speak truth, 
clearly. Listen as the Prophetic Voice opens chapter one: 
My fellow Americans, we are in a bad way. We are drifting. Our 
leaders are compromising, compromised. They have lost sight of gov­
ernment's basic purposes. 
It is time for us to take the future into our own hands. Each of us 
has gained so much from life in America. Can we remain idle while 
this great nation drifts downward? 
No: We must join together in a movement for national renewal, 
even if this means self-sacrifice. We will not stop until the govern­
ment has heard our voice. 
The People must retake control of government. We must act deci­
sively to bring the law in line with the promise of American life. [p. 3] 
Ackerman reenters the book to observe that "[s]ince the first 
Englishmen colonized America, this voice has never been silent." 
The Voice is a composite of a Puritan Jeremiah,119 Walter 
Lippman,120 Herbert Croly,121 Franklin D. Roosevelt,122 John F. 
Kennedy,123 evangelical nationalists,124 civil rights protestors, and 
118. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BorroM OF THE WELL (1992); RICHARD 
DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE 
(1995). Ackerman has long been interested in the role of "storytelling" in the law. See RB. 
CONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 29, 31, 52-55, 73. 
119. See SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD (1978). 
120. See w ALTER LIPPMAN, DRIFT AND MASTERY! AN ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE 
CURRENT UNREST (1914). 
121. See HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909). 
122. The phrase "My fellow Americans" evokes Roosevelt's fireside chats. See 2 
Roosevelt, The First "Fireside Chat" - An Intimate Talk with the People of the United States 
on Banking. March I2, 1933, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 61-65 (1938). 
123. See John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, in THE KENNEDY 
READER 7-11 (Jay David ed., 1967). 
124. See PERRY MILLER, The Evangelical Basis, in THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 
3-95 (1965). 
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others. The melody is eclectic, though Progressive tones dominate. 
It sounds more prosperous than not, with the peremptory cadence 
of talk radio. The Voice speaks rarely in Ackerman's pages, but it 
remains the protagonist. "It is this voice that will concern us here, 
as well as the distinctive attitude Americans have cultivated in its 
exercise" (p. 3). Listen, and government will be returned to the 
People's control. 
Why the Prophetic Voice? Perhaps its most arresting quality is 
that it sounds so different from another abstraction influencing 
legal studies, an abstraction that Ackerman has explored elsewhere: 
the Market.125 The Voice shows faith in human agency, affirmative 
social justice, and redistribution - at least of political power. 
When the government is out of control, the People should reassert 
power, not repose faith in the invisible hand. 
But is government out of the People's control? Certainly the 
federal government sometimes appears to be so, especially when 
observed on Washington-originated news programs: repetition, 
punditry, stone-skipping history, and much talk of the People. 
Change the channel, however, and a more meaningful, if more tedi­
ous, government comes into focus. On local access channels, little 
is heard of the People; instead, actual people discuss concrete 
needs, desires, and fears. There one hears about tax rates, public 
improvements, and education. Then there are the myriad contro­
versies about the physical environment in which people live and 
work each day, all the tough, sometimes nasty social and cultural 
politics that fall under the rubric of zoning. To find out what popu­
lar sovereignty means today, it may be time to take a new look at 
local government. 
Along with zooming in on the local world, one might pan out 
beyond the nation. Of course, deciphering the past is difficult 
enough. Still, query whether the jurisdictions studied in these 
books - the United States, as a nation and constituent states -
will remain the primary units of jurisdictional analysis in law 
schools of the future. With the resurgence of zip-code identity on 
the one hand, and world wide web access on the other, where pre­
cisely will nationality fit in? Reports of the nation-state's death 
have been exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is unclear how Ackerman's 
and Amar's students will receive the professors' nationalist narra­
tive. To the historian of twenty-first century consciousness, any dis­
junction might indicate changing recruitment and socialization 
within that profession or between its scholars and practitioners. 
Of course, the nation will not pass. But it will continue to 
change shape, and its claims on the identity of its citizens will 
125. See generally RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7. 
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change too. Similarly, any decline of national identity would not 
mean the decline of the United States. Is there a framework for 
understanding how people might draw on several political identities 
simultaneously, emphasizing one for certain purposes and a second 
or third for others? Consider that the United States emerged from 
an early modern empire, became gradually in the nineteenth cen­
tury a nation, and may now be metamorphosing again into another 
kind of empire, one marked by the diffuse but palpable spread of its 
culture, including its legal culture. It is a special kind of imperial­
ism, full of informal modes of operation, more like those of the 
early modern period than the nineteenth-century. Here is where 
the pre-history of American constitutionalism might be instructive. 
Ackerman writes that the prophetic Voice of the People has spoken 
"[s]ince the first Englishmen colonized America" (p. 3) but is unin­
terested in what it was saying for almost two centuries before 1787. 
In the early modern world, English influence spread less through 
official foreign policy than the "ventures" of privileged groups, 
often joint-stock companies possessing, to one degree or another, 
license from the crown. At various times the King, his Privy Coun­
cil, or his agents in America tried to centralize imperial policy, fail­
ing more often than not, so that it is only a bit of an exaggeration to 
see the American Revolution as less a progressive fight for democ­
racy than a reactionary defense of long (and not so long) accrued 
local privileges against an increasingly interventionist central gov­
ernment.126 Earlier it was argued that early modern localism was 
greatly concerned with jurisdictions smaller than the state. These 
were not just towns and counties. A corporation, for example, 
could be a territorial jurisdiction, or it might be something else. As 
the etymological fiction had it, corporations were alive. And they 
moved. Or if the head - the governing board - was immobile,127 
at least the arms might reach out to new lands, across political 
boundaries, redrawing them in the process. This had been true of 
corporations in the Anglophone world at least since the earliest set­
tlement of the American continent, much of which was conducted 
by groups organized as corporations.128 In short, such scripts did 
not always protect "a local communitarian spirit."129 Claims of im­
munity from central government could, paradoxically, serve impe­
rial ambitions. 
126. With some differences, this is the theme of GREENE, supra note 68. 
127. For a mobile corporation council, see GEORGE L. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY 
IN EARLY MAssACHUSErrs: A STUDY IN TRADmoN ANl:> DESIGN 15 {1960). 
128. See 1 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 41 
{1934). 
129. P. 105; see also Carol M. Rose, Ancient Constitutionalism vs. the Federalist Empire: 
Anti-Federalism from the Attacks on "Monarchism" to Modem Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 
74 (1989). 
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Today's functional equivalents might be multinational corpora­
tions. The multinational is just that: operative in many jurisdic­
tions, ambivalently related to each. But usually it speaks 
American-English, and so too its default legal vocabulary derives 
from the United States. The global marketplace, after all, looks 
and sounds familiar. Negotiating among these corporations are the 
new diplomats, investment bankers and consultants; a top-notch 
American professional degree (more often M.B.A. than J.D.)130 re­
placing striped pants as the anthropological marker. More perti­
nent to the books at hand is the influence of U.S. constitutionalism 
abroad. The federal Constitution has long been an international 
model, at least a source of concepts and vocabulary carried abroad 
by legal missionaries. The Founders claimed (as both Ackerman 
and Amar approvingly note) that they were contributing to "the 
Science of Politics";131 it was to be a constitution on a hill, a beacon 
to those less fortunate. Witness the constitutional scholars who 
flocked to Eastern Europe ten years ago, as well as the traditional 
conflation of U.S. constitutional norms and universal values.132 The 
old historical debate here about the sources of U.S. legal culture 
(Anglicization? Americanization?) may soon replicate itself, with 
cosmopolitan mutations, at an international level (Americaniza­
tion? globalization?). Thus American ideas may well dominate 
global constitutionalism, and so discussion of the standards of legiti­
mate constitutional change may persist. But five-step formulae and 
American paradigm cases will probably not "translate"133 out of the 
present historical situation.134 
When highlighting the popular sovereignty premise of Ameri­
can constitutionalism, both are indebted to the "republican revival" 
in early American history. But times are changing in the history 
departments and republicanism, liberalism, and the ideological in­
terpretation are not what they used to be. Gordon Wood's Creation 
130. See Bruce Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY 
351, 372 (1980) (noting that "new professions" pose a "challenge [to] the dominion of the 
traditional American caste of public policymakers - called lawyers"). 
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), at 51 (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961). 
132. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REvoLUITON (1992); CoN­
STITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSIDONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Douglas 
Greenberg et al. eds., 1993). The reflexive conflation of United States and universal law is no 
new theme in the new nation - "A world of our empire, for a world of our laws," wrote 
lawyer and Connecticut wit David Humphreys in the 1790s. The equation persists, as 
Michael J. Sandel has remarked about the work of Ronald Dworkin. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 145-46 (1982). 
133. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1165 (1993). 
134. See ACKERMAN, supra note 132 (on the "velvet revolutions" as a constitutional mo­
ment for Eastern Europe); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. 
REv. 771, 774-75 (1997) (warning law professors that "[i]f we fail to contribute our fair share 
to the analysis of world constitutionalism, it will be tough for others to fill the vacuum" while 
warning that "the American experience [i]s a special case, not . . .  the paradigmatic case"). 
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of the American Republic135 will for a long time remain the best 
study of the constitution-making period. But it must be supple­
mented by newer work in social and institutional history, and stud­
ies just emerging from the renaissance of Atlantic history.136 Of 
course, republicanism is not going away; it was not just a product of 
the Cold War. It will, however, be assimilated into an ever ex­
panding historiographical repertoire, as historians turn to other old 
and new frameworks to understand the movement of people and 
ideas throughout the world. Whiggish histories of how Americans 
perfected the science of politics are already turning stale, as histori­
ans become more skeptical of national exceptionalism and tri­
umphalism (the juggernaut of popular sovereignty included). 
Consequently, the historical premise of both Ackerman and Amar 
seems a bit dated. But often fashions change too fast in the acad­
emy, and some interpretations deserve the long half-life they enjoy 
in the survey literature. The question is why embellish this one 
now? Or, what is the point of reconstructing American constitu­
tional history as the progressive vindication of popular sovereignty? 
III. THE NEW LEGAL HISTORICISM137 
Criticisms of Ackerman's and Amar's historical interpretations 
are open to the charge of irrelevance because they (especially 
Ackerman)138 deny that they are writing professional history. In­
stead, they are trying to rewrite (again, in Ackerman's terms) the 
"professional narrative" of constitutional change. Theirs are explic­
itly forward-looking, usable pasts, not so much "lawyers' history," 
"forensic history," or "lawyers' legal history"139 as history for law­
yers. Which is to say that their historical constitutionalism is in­
tended less to add weapons to the advocate's arsenal than to change 
the way the legal community conceptualizes the Constitution and 
change beneath it. 
135. GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1972). 
136. For a history of the idea of Atlantic history and a partial prospectus, see BERNARD 
BAILYN, THE IDEA OF ATLANTIC HISTORY (International Seminar on the History of the At­
lantic World, Harvard University, Working Paper No. 96-01, 1996). 
137. Cf. BROOK THOMAS, THE NEW HISTORICISM AND OTHER OLD-FASHIONED TOPICS 
(1991). 
138. "There is lots of history in this book, some political science, a little philosophy - but 
these interdisciplinary excursions are in the service of a fundamentally legal enterprise." P. 
28. 
139. Good discussions of this problem include Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Mod­
em American Constitutionalism, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 523 (1995); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the 
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 119 ("law-office history"); William E. 
Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 1237 (1986) 
(distinguishing "lawyers' legal history" and "historians' legal history"); and John P. Reid, 
Law and History, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 193, 203 (1993) ("forensic history"). 
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At some level, this concern with legitimating constitutional 
change is a measure of the success of conservative originalism.140 
Proposed amendments to undo postwar liberal jurisprudence and 
candid, actuarial court-packing suggested to Ackerman a stultifying 
"hypertextualism" on the one hand and a "legal realist" approach 
to constitutionalism on the other - the tasteless extremes, he 
thinks, of the constitutional menu offered in today's law schools. 
He criticizes both and works to define a middle road for constitu­
tional theory.141 In a different way, Amar's "one-two synthesis" of 
the Founding and Reconstruction (p. 300), showing how and when 
the rights-oriented Bill became "America's Parthenon" (p. xi), is 
implicitly designed to refute the deliberately ahistorical, plain 
meaning version of textualism that might undermine those rights, as 
well as cast doubt on historically untethered, extratextual rights. 
A frustrating aspect of Amar's book is that he never discusses 
his minor premise: that historically informed textualism is the cor­
rect way to interpret the Constitution today. He assumes that if his 
history and interpretations are correct they should be the standard 
against which to measure constitutional law. Even if he is right 
about that history and those interpretations, this is a large assump­
tion and needs more support. He never explicitly discusses the 
plain meaning textual approach. He never explains, as Ackerman 
does, why his method is preferable to democratic "monism" or neo­
Kantian rights jurisprudence. About unenumerated rights, he 
writes that "we need a good account of these rights before we can 
use open-ended language to interpolate between and extrapolate 
beyond these textual rights."142 One might agree with this ap­
proach, but is its legitimacy self-evident? 
Ackerman is more explicit about his methods. Many have 
talked about the importance of legal consciousness, but few agree 
on what it is and how it might be changed.143 Ackerman actually 
wants to alter the profession's consciousness; given the number of 
pages he publishes and reviews he receives, he may. Not all of his 
discursive innovations will survive the Darwinist process of law­
school mainstreaming, but many will - some already have. After 
140. See KALMAN, supra note 61, at 132-43 (discussing the "tum to history" in the legal 
academy). 
141. This is not the first time Ackerman has embraced and transformed the methodolo­
gical innovations of those whose politics conflict with his own. See RECONSTRUCTING, supra 
note 7, at 42-45 (challenging law professors to accept techniques of law and economics while 
rejecting its conclusions). 
142. P. 299. While Amar claims that he is not opposed to judicial protection of 
unenumerated rights, his tone, at least, suggests serious reservations about them. See, e.g., p. 
297 (referring to the "'these are a few of my favorite rights"' style of constitutional theory). 
143. See REcoNSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 70-71. 
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Ronald Dworkin, he is arguably the preeminent liberal jurisprudent 
of his generation. 
He means to make the most of his lectern. Long ago Ackerman 
flagged socialization as integral to the "reconstruction" of Ameri­
can law. It was imperative, he wrote, "to consider how the law 
shapes social perception and evaluation through a complex process 
of education and indoctrination."144 At the same time, "no group 
of professionals can survive economically, sociologically, spiritually 
without a general sense that it provides a distinctive service of 
value."145 In other words, law - its institutions and discourses -
influences valuation; but in tum, the legal community demands that 
its resources be normatively grounded. A basic narrative of consti­
tutional history might change that conceptual basis and supply 
those values. Historical integrity is not the point. Professional in­
tegrity is. 
So Ackerman has constructed the most ambitious outline of 
American legal history since that of Roscoe Pound.146 Like Pound, 
Ackerman is trying to awaken the profession to its formative eras. 
He too is drawn to social science methods, and he has an uncom­
fortable but intellectually genetic relation to legal realism (Pound a 
pedantic, long-lived ancestor,147 Ackerman a scolding heir). Miss­
ing, of course, is Pound's academic Germanophilia. Indeed, a strik­
ing aspect of Ackerman's work is its fealty to English-American 
ways. "I have been trying," he writes early in Transformations, "to 
redeem the promise of Anglo-American legal method" (p. 66). 
Similarly, in Foundations he complained that his colleagues' "ex­
alted talk of Kant and Locke only emphasizes the elitism involved 
in removing fundamental questions from the democratic process"148 
and then celebrated the empirical, "Burkean" common lawyer: 
\Vhat counts for the common lawyer is not some fancy theory but the 
patterns of concrete decision built up by courts and other practical 
decisionmakers over decades, generations, centuries . . . .  The task of 
the Burkean lawyer or judge is to master these precedents, thereby 
gaining a sense of their hidden potentials for growth and decay.149 
What Ackerman means by the common law is not always clear 
(not, of course, an idiosyncratic problem).150 At times common law 
144. Id. at 71. 
145. Id. at 19. 
146. See RoscoE PoUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (Peter Smith ed., 
1950). 
147. See N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997). 
148. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 12. 
149. Id. at 17. On Ackerman's use of Burke, see Moglen, supra note 42, at 547-52. 
150. "Ask a Lawyer, What is Co=on Law? • • .  He knows not what common law is • • • •  " 
Jeremy Bentham Mss., University College, London, cited in DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROV-
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method means simply respect for precedent. At others it sounds 
like evolutionary custom. It can also mean the induction of 
principle from the raw material of legal behavior on the ground. 
Once found, it remains the same, even as its derivative rules and 
applications mutate,151 not unlike the fivefold formula of constitu­
tional amendment. Finally, Ackerman's common law recalls 
Pound's distinction between law in action and law in books. "For 
common lawyers," Ackerman writes, "the key is not what a court 
says, but what it does."152 So too it is with the Constitution, prac­
tice fleshing out text. 
Of these, abstraction most characterizes his history. Take for 
example his metaphor in Foundations illustrating the contention 
that "the path of the law is from the particularistic to comprehen­
sive analysis": 
Think of the American Republic as a railroad train, with the judges of 
the middle republic sitting in the caboose, looking backward. What 
they see are the mountains and valleys of dualistic constitutional ex­
perience, most notably the peaks of constitutional meaning elabo­
rated during the Founding and Reconstruction. As the train moves 
forward in history, it is harder for the judges to see the traces of vol­
canic ash that marked each mountain's political emergence onto the 
legal landscape. At the same time, a different perspective becomes 
more available: as the second mountain moves into the background, 
it becomes easier to see that there is now a mountain range out there 
that can be described in a comprehensive way.153 
This is remarkable: the judiciary as a backward-looking institution, 
struggling to make sense of the whole constitutional experience, 
constantly moving out from the specific intent of a transformative 
amendment toward its more general, fundamental meaning. As 
with so much of Ackerman's elegant analysis, it is hard to refute, 
standing as it does on its own premises and following the logic of 
induction almost instinctive to lawyers. The result is a wonderful 
picture. Start with the way it naturalizes constitutional develop­
ment, leaving the judiciary as an artificial element in the land­
scape,154 with no agency but passive, myopic observation. Forget 
the concrete, contingent, human disputes that fuel litigation. When 
that surface grime is cleaned away, the masterpiece is revealed. 
The Supreme Court's role is less to say what the Constitution is 
than gradually behold the wonders of constitutional creation, as 
INCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENfH-CENTURY BRITAIN 
235 n.71 (1989). 
151. See RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 43 n.13. 
152. P. 246; see also p. 360. 
153. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 98-99. 
154. A familiar trope of American romanticism. See LEo MA.Rx, THE MACHINE IN THE 
GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL IN AMERICA (1964). 
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Justices glimpse beyond the picturesque (or not so picturesque) to 
the beautiful, perhaps farther. Theirs is an art of mimesis. But it is 
just a metaphor. Ultimately, Ackerman remains a constitutional 
positivist; the law may be sublime but not otherworldly. Deus ex 
machina is the People. And the Court does play an active role of 
"intergenerational synthesis," an idea rehearsed quickly in the first 
two volumes and the promised subject of the third, Interpretations. 
The highlight there will be his treatment of Brown v. Board of 
Education.155 
Ackerman is genuinely concerned with how unrooted the legal 
presumptions of his generation seem, how susceptible they have 
been to conservative attack: originalism and textualism in the case 
of constitutional jurisprudence, invocations of the market in private 
law. He has asked whether his is "a generation of betrayal"156 be­
cause it has not persuasively justified the New Deal or the Supreme 
Court's postwar civil rights cases. Which might be to say that it has 
yet to answer the question of whether Brown adheres to a neutral 
principle.157 Ackerman's civics lesson is designed to tutor lawyers 
in more creative ways of apprehending both the New Deal and 
postwar liberal jurisprudence. He hopes to replace the Lochner im­
age of judicial review,158 which led to the countermajoritarian inter­
pretation, with a popular sovereignty one. The goal is to 
demonstrate that a synthesis of Reconstruction's popularly 
accepted principle of racial equality with the New Deal's popularly 
accepted principle of the national welfare state justifies Brown.159 
This is a laudable jurisprudential objective, notwithstanding its his­
torical simplifications. But communal narratives have their ambig­
uous side (not least because resistant to conscious rewriting); 
orthodox theories tend to scant heterodox practices.160 And query 
whether his legitimacy-inducing narrative, especially as it achieves 
some autonomy from its author, may support something other than 
155. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
156. Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. RE.v. 1519 (1997). 
157. The question posed by Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu· 
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. RE.v. 1 (1959). See also Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the Bicenten· 
nia� 87 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 1565, 1599-602 (1987) (arguing that "Ackerman proposes to 
construct a new understanding of judicial review different from the traditional view of that 
doctrine as 'countermajoritarian."'). 
158. See Steven A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional 
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. RE.v. 1 (1991). 
159. Cf. Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamental· 
ity Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. RE.v. 32 (1993) (arguing that modem constitu­
tionalism ought to rest on a substantive, not a procedural, theory of democracy). 
160. Although Ackerman and Amar are committed to demonstrating that the Constitu­
tion has changed over time, they hesitate to acknowledge that multiple interpretations might 
exist at any one time. 
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Ackerman's version of popular sovereignty.161 And it is rare to find 
a modem legal theory in which the Weberian concept of legitima­
tion has such a positive connotation.162 It is not for the faint of 
heart, this project of uncritical, mythic history. The standard of suc­
cess is not acceptance among professional historians, political scien­
tists, or philosophers; success, on Ackerman's own terms, depends 
on the absorption of his narrative into the legal community. Hence 
his emphasis on taxonomy and structure. He may judge the project 
a success if, when lawyers talk about the Constitution, they talk in 
terms of moments, constitutional politics, eruptions (but very con­
trolled eruptions) of the People, and so forth, even if many dispute 
his analysis here and there. In consciousness formation, control 
over vocabulary is half the battle, as Ackerman learned when strug­
gling with the law and economics movement. The model is in the 
language, not separate from it. Accept Ackerman's language and 
you are pretty much lodged inside his conceptual world, whether or 
not it is the world we have lost or know now. Only time will tell if 
this new civics can produce the constitutional world of the future. 
161. Such uncertainty is now treated as a mark of a rigorous constitutional theory. See 
Amar p. 297 ("In a textualist book . . . I was obliged to confront the stubborn text that stands 
between the words of Amendment I and III"); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: 
Rethinking the Constitutional Relationship Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DuKE L.J. 1, 
54 ("One could reach nearly any substantive result . . .  from within the interpretive frame­
work that I reco=end."). 
162. Ackerman has previously referred to the need to create a legitimating consciousness 
to support the law, citing Max Weber. See REcoNSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 71 n.31; 
Ackerman, supra note 130, at 372 (1980). For a different, Gramscian approach to conscious­
ness and legitimation, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 
(1984). 
